The paper entitled "Against Many-Worlds Interpretations" by A. Kent, which has recently been submitted to the e-Print archive (gr-qc/9703089) contained some misconceptions. The claims on Everett's many-worlds interpretation are quoted and answered.
In the paper [1] (Subsection "A. Everett" in Section II. "THE CASE AGAINST"), the author tries to illustrate problems on the Everett MWI [2] by a simple example (typographic errors are corrected, all quotes appear in italics):
Suppose that a previously polarized spin- 1 2 particle has just had its spin measured by a macroscopic Stern-Gerlach device, on an axis chosen so that the probability of measuring spin + 1 2 is 2 3 . The result can be idealized by the wavefunction
where φ 0 is the spin + . Now in trying to interpret this result we encounter the following problems: . . .
First of all, the above wavefunction does not describe any quantum-mechanical measurement
process which is distinguished from the classical one by the occurrence of the collapse-ofwavefunction (COW) phenomenon. It simply describes a state after the interaction between the spin and the Stern-Gerlach device occurred. Quantum mechanics cannot contradict with the above description, even the Copenhagen interpretation agrees with until an observation by an observer takes place [3] .
In Everett's MWI, it is essential to consider an observer state, in which all physical informations which were observed by the observer are embedded. Therefore, the above equation should be replaced by
where, Ψ 0 and Ψ 1 denote the observer states who observed the spin + respectively. This is a direct consequence of (A) the linearity of the time evolution operator U(t) which includes the interaction between the object and observer systems and of (B) the relation which should be satisfied if the object system is prepared in the eigenstates φ i and the observer system is prepared to observe the observable (the spin component):
The author continues:
Firstly, no choice of basis has been specified; we could expand φ in the 1-dimensional basis {φ} or any of the orthogonal 2-dimensional bases . There is no objective COW, but it appears to the observer that the state of the object system has collapsed into one of the eigenstates of the observable, while the whole system which includes the observer system is still in a superposition. This is the Everett MWI.
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We do not have to require any loss of coherence between the branched states: The process described by Eq. (2b), in which there is no room for indicating any kind of decoherence, defines the observer states unambiguously. This is why there is no need for a preferred basis.
(Given a Hamiltonian, eigenstates of the object system, initial state of the measurement device, and initial state of the observer system, we can check if Eq. (2b) holds true.)
The following claim comes from author's misconception. The probability is not a branching rate into many-worlds, but is the relative frequency which is counted by the observer in each world [4] . It is easy to show that the observer who is described in each element of the superposition agrees that the relative frequency equals to where, µ(Φ ǫ ) is introduced by the author as a measure. However, it is not the Everett measure, but is a norm which is equal to (Everett measure) 1/2 (see author's claim below Axiom 1E). The claim seems to arise from a confusion of two totally different concepts;
Secondly
"norm of a state vector" and "measure of a subset in a superposition".
In order to derive quantitative results in a theory, we need to have a measure. Even in a classical theory, we have a measure, though it is trivial one [2] . If we have no measure in a theory there is no hope of finding any quantitative result in it (think of measure in path integral, for example). What Everett showed in his paper is that we can construct a consistent quantum theory of a closed system if we take the Everett measure.
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